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Abstract 
This study scrutinises the role of cultural and institutional contexts in shaping Europeans’ choices 
for a source of support. We draw attention to an often overlooked source of support:  non-kin. 
Taking an interdisciplinary theoretical approach, we formulate a number of hypotheses on the 
impact of individualistic values, familialistic norms, generalised trust, and social protection 
expenditure. We test these contextual hypotheses by means of multilevel multinomial models 
employing European Quality of Life Survey data from 28 countries. Our findings reveal that more 
generous social protection expenditure seems to create a sense of solidarity that bolsters people to 
rely on non-kin. This impact is however weaker than that of cultural context. Regarding 
individualistic values and norms of family obligations, we find that the latter are of a greater 
importance in predicting behavioural intentions. Finally, our findings evince that in countries with 
lower rather than with higher levels of generalised trust people are more likely to turn to non-kin. 
We argue that this effect is driven by the inclusion of a vast number of Central and Eastern 
European countries, which share a distinct post-communist context.  
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Introduction 
When one is in need, several options are at hand. A person can opt for help from kin, be it the 
nuclear or extended family; one can turn to non-kin, i.e. the wide circle of friends, neighbours and 
acquaintances; or an individual can choose to receive help from a professional. In the European 
research on support, each source of assistance has been examined to a greatly varying degree. Kin 
ties – in particular close relatives – have received by far the most attention, followed by 
professionals, whereas non-kin ties have been sorely understudied. The few studies on the 
supporting role of friends and neighbours show that non-kin ties provide primarily emotional and 
practical help (Heady & Schweitzer, 2010; Wenger, 2001), as well as that their importance as a 
source of care and assistance tend to increase when a person has never had (Albertini & Mencarini, 
2014; Wenger et al., 2007) or has exhausted the family resources (Kalwij, Pasini, & Wu, 2014; 
Lapierre & Keating, 2013). Moreover, the extent to which non-relatives play a part in one’s social 
(support) network varies across countries; compared with Southern and Eastern European nations, 
where family-based social networks are predominant, in Nordic and Western European societies 
there is a higher frequency of friends-based social networks (Höllinger & Haller, 1990; Stoeckel 
& Litwin, 2013).  
 
Country differences in the extent to which people rely on different sources of support are often 
assumed to be the result of varying degrees of welfare provision and cultural norms, but 
empirically speaking surprisingly little cross-national research has been undertaken to test this 
contextual hypothesis. As yet, only a few studies have adopted a multilevel approach to investigate 
the role of context and they have exclusively focused on family support. Kalmijn and Saraceno 
(2008) tested the impact of cultural context in Europe, showing that in more familialistic countries 
adult children are more likely to provide care and support to their parents in need. Brandt and 
colleagues (2009; 2011), on the other hand, examined the effect of welfare provision and evinced 
that in more generous states relatives are less likely to provide demanding care, though they are 
more likely to provide practical support and money.  
 
In the present study, we draw attention to an often overlooked source of support – non-kin – and 
set out to examine European country differences in the extent to which friends, neighbours and 
others who do not belong to one’s family serve as a source of assistance. We conduct multilevel 
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multinomial analysis to test a number of hypotheses on the role of cultural and institutional 
contexts in shaping Europeans’ choices for receiving help from non-kin as compared with 
receiving help either from kin or from professionals. When formulating the hypotheses we discuss 
the impact of cultural and institutional contexts separately, primarily for the sake of simplicity. 
Yet, we recognise that culture and welfare provision interrelate and consider them simultaneously 
in the empirical analysis. The analysis rests on four types of support, namely help with household 
chores when one is ill, advice, financial help, and help when looking for a job.   
 
Conceptualising cultural context 
For all that is written in sociology about the power of cultural context in explaining country 
differences, the discussion has remained largely qualitative and the concept of culture fuzzy. 
Culture has rarely been conceptualised, yet is habitually used as a black box for residual, 
unexplained by empirical analyses differences between countries (Nonnenmacher & Friedrichs, 
2013). Unlike previous research, we first conceptualise cultural context as levels of 
individualism/collectivism, familialism and generalised trust, and then move on to explain and test 
the mechanisms through which culture might impact Europeans’ choices for a source of support.  
 
In family studies, there exists a long-lasting tradition of dividing Europe into cultural regions, i.e. 
more individualistic Northern and Western European countries and more familialistic Southern 
and Eastern European nations (Reher, 1998; Viazzo, 2010). In so doing, commentators have often 
equated the concepts of individualism/collectivism and familialism, though they have also debated 
the existence of a causal relationship, where increased levels of individualism have supposedly led 
to decreased levels of familialism (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015). Empirical research suggests 
that lower levels of familialism are manifested in less intensive support exchange between family 
members (micro-level), the rise of the nuclear family and new forms of family formation (meso-
level), and weakened norms of family obligations (macro-level) (Silverstein & Giarrusso, 2011).  
 
Whilst we concede that individualism and familialism are interrelated, we also argue that they are 
different approaches to culture. Focusing on the macro-level, we choose to examine the 
relationship between both individualistic values and familialistic norms, and one’s choice for a 
source of support. Two main arguments underpin this decision. First, individualism and its 
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opposite – collectivism – represent a broader concept of culture than familialism does and, as such, 
allows for testing hypotheses comparing not only non-kin and kin but also non-kin and 
professionals as alternative sources of support. Building upon “The Big Three” of cross-cultural 
studies – Hofstede, Schwartz and Inglehart – we depict individualism as a cultural dimension or, 
in other words, as part of a broader system of basic, deep-rooted values which serve as a guiding 
principle in life. Society-wide held basic values have, on the one hand, the power to explain the 
diversity of practices across countries and, on the other, they underlie within-country, specific 
values, norms and attitudes in specific domains of social life, such as the family (Ester, Mohler, & 
Vinken, 2006). Familialism, when defined as norms of family obligations, can thus be seen as 
influenced by levels of individualism and as a more specific approach to culture with explanatory 
power limited to kin practices.  
 
Note that the constructs of values and norms differ. Basic values reflect what people consider to 
be important to themselves, whereas norms reflect shared expectations about what members of a 
society should or should not do (Minkov & Hofstede, 2011; Schwartz, 2012). Values are, 
moreover, seen as relatively stable and even durable (Ester, Mohler & Vinken, 2006; Hofstede, 
Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010), whilst shared expectations are a complex product, and conceivably 
also the root, of recent levels of welfare provision, and country-specific policies and legal 
regulations (Cooney & Dykstra, 2011; Millar & Warman, 1996). By examining both 
individualistic values and norms of family obligations, we are thus able to separate the effect of 
what people truly believe is right to do from the effect of what people feel they are expected to do 
given the current structural environment in which they are embedded.  
 
In addition to levels of individualism and familialism, we extend the conceptualisation of cultural 
context to include generalised trust, which according to Uslaner (2002) is a cultural value that 
people learn early in life. Generalised trust is defined as “the belief that people will not deliberately 
or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible” 
(Delhey & Newton, 2005: 311). As yet, generalised trust has not been considered as a possible 
explanation for why in some countries people rely less on family members than in other countries, 
but we argue that it may have an impact on choosing to receive help from non-kin rather than kin 
through its ability to ease social interaction and cooperation.  
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Links between the cultural context and non-kin support 
In this section we formulate five hypotheses referring to the role of cultural context in shaping 
Europeans’ choices for receiving help from non-relatives. Four of the hypotheses deal with the 
impact of respectively individualism/collectivism (two alternative hypotheses), familialism and 
generalised trust on the likelihood that a person will turn to non-kin rather than kin. An additional 
hypothesis pertains to the impact of individualism on the likelihood that a person will turn to non-
kin rather than a professional. Since familialism and generalised trust do not provide a theoretical 
rationale when it comes to the contrast between non-kin and professionals, we do not derive such 
hypotheses.  
 
Generalised trust is thought to serve as a foundation for a sense of solidarity, togetherness and 
cooperation, and to function as social glue that creates a sense of community to fellow citizens 
(Delhey & Newton, 2005; Uslaner, 2008). This implies that people in societies with high levels of 
generalised trust can be expected to more readily engage in social relationships with others, i.e. 
those outside the close circle of family members. Furthermore, since high levels of generalised 
trust reflect lower levels of risk of being deceived, people in countries high on trust may feel more 
confident in shifting demands for social support to the community at large. We therefore expect 
that in countries with higher levels of generalised trust people will select non-kin over kin more 
frequently than in countries with lower levels of generalised trust (Hypothesis 1).  
 
Similarly, compared with more individualistic societies, in more collectivistic countries people 
may select non-kin over kin and professionals more frequently as a result of an existing assortment 
of socially valued qualities such as cooperation, social responsibility and group togetherness 
(Peterson, 2009). People who live according to collectivistic principles view the welfare of their 
larger community as central to the concept of the self (Gaines et al., 1997) and strive to maintain 
a sense of solidarity and harmony through fulfilment of their duty to the group. This sense of 
solidarity and harmony is, furthermore, sustained through heightened sensitivity to the needs of 
community’s members, empathy and reciprocity (Sorensen & Oyserman, 2009). Since fulfilment 
of one’s duty to the group implies giving whereas reciprocity by definition infers that one gives 
with the intention to receive, people in more collectivistic countries can be expected to more 
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readily provide but also demand from the circle of communal relationships, a circle that expands 
beyond the family1. Furthermore, unlike more individualistic societies where people may seek to 
achieve the desired autonomy and independence through purchasing professional help, in more 
collectivistic societies, people may rather turn to non-kin asking them to fulfil their duty to the 
group. We therefore hypothesise that in more collectivistic countries people will select non-kin 
over respectively kin2 and professionals more frequently than in more individualistic countries 
(Hypothesis 2 and 3).  
 
Whilst higher levels of collectivism may reinforce choosing the receipt of help from non-kin 
through cooperation, higher levels of individualism may have an impact through intensifying the 
number of social relationships. Compared with more collectivistic countries, where social 
relationships and group belonging are largely prearranged and relatively fixed over one’s life time, 
in more individualistic countries social relationships are shown to be voluntary, carefully fostered 
and as result also greater in number and diversity (Hofstede et al., 2010; Oyserman, Coon, & 
Kemmelmeier, 2002). In other words, people in more individualistic societies are less restricted in 
expanding their social connections beyond the family – the first group in which an individual is 
integrated (Hofstede et al., 2010). Since a greater number of social contacts implies a greater access 
to various types of support, people in more individualistic countries may be able to leave behind 
and substitute (partly) the safety net which family ties provide with that of non-kin ties. Following 
this rationale, we formulate an alternative hypothesis, which states that in more individualistic 
countries people will select non-kin over kin more frequently than in more collectivistic countries 
(Hypothesis 4).  
 
Finally, we argue that in more familialistic countries – that is countries where people exhibit and 
subscribe to norms of strong family obligations – people will select non-kin over kin less frequently 
than in less familialistic countries (Hypothesis 5). Here, it is important to note that the predictive 
strength of the concept of familialism lies in explaining whether a person is likely or not to select 
kin ties as a primary source of support. It does not therefore provide clear clues as to whether 
people who are less likely to turn to kin will at the same time be more likely to turn to non-kin. 
We feel, nevertheless, safe in assuming that when strong feelings of family obligations prevail, 
people will be less likely to opt for any other source of support than kin.  
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Links between the institutional context and non-kin support 
Compared with the cultural context, the institutional environment in Europe has been better 
examined in empirical research on support. Yet, most of the knowledge about the link between the 
institutional context and support provision comes from family sociology, where scholars have 
focused on understanding the interdependencies between the state and the family (Brandt et al., 
2009; Brandt & Deindl, 2013). In doing so, they have neglected non-relatives as an alternative 
source of support. In the present study, we address this gap and bring new insights by probing into 
the relationship between social protection expenditure and the likelihood that a person will turn to 
non-kin rather than to kin or professionals when in need. Building upon the assumption that the 
availability of generous public spending will crowd out informal support – be it from kin or non-
kin – we expect that in countries with more generous welfare provision people will select non-kin 
over professionals less frequently than in countries with less generous welfare provision 
(Hypothesis 6). Moreover, following notions of crowding in, namely that more generous welfare 
provision enables family members to provide more practical and financial help (Brandt et al., 2009; 
Deindl & Brandt, 2011), we expect that in states which offer ample assistance, needs will be more 
easily met by family members and the support which non-kin ties could provide may become 
redundant. We therefore hypothesise that in countries with more generous welfare provision 
people will select non-kin over kin less frequently than in countries with less generous welfare 
provision (Hypothesis 7).  
 
Methodological Approach  
To test the hypotheses, we use data from the most recent (2011-2012) round of the European 
Quality of Life Survey (EQLS). The EQLS is conducted every four years by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Our sample consists of 28 
countries in Europe, namely the European Union countries except for Greece and Cyprus, and two 
candidate countries – Serbia and Iceland. The sample size per country varies between 1000 
(Bulgaria and Slovakia) and 3055 (Germany) observations. The age of the respondents ranges from 
18 to 95 years.  
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Dependent variables 
Our analysis rests on four dependent variables reflecting four types of support. They are based on 
the questions “From whom would you get support in each of the following situations: (1) if you 
needed help around the household when ill; (2) if you needed advice about a serious personal or 
family matter; (3) if you needed to urgently raise [1/12 of annual national at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold] to face an emergency; and (4) if you needed help when looking for a job. For each 
situation, choose the most important source of support”. The respondents were able to choose 
between the following answers: “a member of your family/relative” (kin); “a friend, neighbour or 
someone else who do not belong to your family or relatives” (non-kin); “a service provider, 
institution or organisation” (professionals); and “nobody”. Since we are interested in comparing 
individual choices for receiving help from non-kin rather than kin or professionals, we removed 
from our sample those who answered nobody. For help with household chores, advice, financial 
help and help when looking for a job, we removed respectively 1.9%, 2.9%, 8.8% and 18.9% of 
the observations. Since the principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Hedeker, 2007) 
holds true in our multinomial models, omitting nobody as an alternative outcome did not affect the 
odds among the remaining outcomes.  
Independent variables at the country-level 
Data on country levels of individualism/collectivism were obtained through Hofstede’s webpage 
(Hofstede, 2014)3. The Hofstede’s index ranges from 0 to 100, where higher scores signify higher 
levels of individualism. Figure 1 displays the index of individualism per country. According to 
these data, higher levels of individualism are found in the West and North of Europe (and 
surprisingly Hungary). At the other extreme are the post-communist countries and Portugal.  
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Figure 1: Per country index of individualism 
Source: The Hofstede Centre (Hofstede, 2014) 
To our knowledge there are no ready-to-use macro-level measures of norms of family obligations 
and generalised trust. Therefore, we generated both measures by taking the arithmetic mean of 
individual-level scores. Data on norms of family obligations were obtained from the fourth (2008) 
wave of the European Value Survey and are based on the questions “Which of these statements 
best describes your views about (a) parents’ responsibilities to their children and (b) 
responsibilities of adult children towards their parents when their parents are in need of long-term 
care?”. The statements were respectively “parents’/children’s duty is to do their best for their 
children/parents even at the expense of their own well-being” and “parents/children have a life of 
their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their 
children/parents”. Lower numbers of the measure represent more familialistic and higher numbers 
less familialistic countries. Figure 2 depicts the degree of familialism per country. Our data suggest 
that the Nordic and Western European countries (and surprisingly Lithuania) are less familialistic, 
whereas more familialistic countries are found in the South and East of Europe.  
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Figure 2: Per country norms of family obligations 
Source: European Value Survey (2008) 
For generating the measure of generalised trust we used data from the third round of EQLS4. The 
trust question in the EQLS is a standard question used throughout cross-national surveys, which 
despite its shortcomings is proven to be a reliable, valid and cross-nationally comparable 
instrument (Nannestad, 2008). The question reads as follows: “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. Answers 
are measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you can’t be too careful and 10 means 
that most people can be trusted. The average country scores (Figure 3) resemble a well-
documented pattern of low levels of generalised trust in the post-communist countries (Bjørnskov, 
2006) and high levels in the Nordic countries (Delhey & Newton, 2005).  
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Figure 3: Per country average levels of generalised trust 
Source: European Quality of Life Survey (Eurofound, 2012) 
 
We obtained the last macro level variable – social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
in 2011 – from the Eurostat database (Eurostat, 2015a). According to Eurostat’s definition, social 
protection expenditure encompasses “social benefits, or transfers in cash or kind, to households 
and individuals with the aim to relieve them of the burden of a defined set of risks or needs” such 
as disability; old age; parental responsibilities; the loss of a spouse or parent; and unemployment. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, there are pronounced country differences across Europe. The Nordic 
and Western European countries have the highest spending on social protection whilst the lowest 
spending on social protection is found in the post-communist countries.  
Finally, since countries with higher levels of modernisation and economic development are also 
known to have higher levels of individualism (Hofstede et al., 2010) and trust (Delhey & Newton, 
2005), and more modern family attitudes (Aassve, Sironi, & Bassi, 2011), we control for GDP per 
capita. We derived the data on GDP per capita for 2011 from the Eurostat database (Eurostat, 
2015b).   
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Figure 4: Per country social protection expenditure as a percentage of country’s GDP 
Source: Eurostat, 2015a 
Control variables at the individual-level 
Given our focus on examining the role of context in shaping European’s choices for a source of 
support, we treat individual-level characteristics merely as controls. Following theoretical insights 
into the mechanisms that govern the configuration of support systems at the individual level 
(Cantor, 1979; Litwak & Szelenyi, 1969) and prior research (i.e. Wenger, 1990), we control for 
people’s socio-economic and demographic background, living arrangements, frequency of contact, 
and relationship closeness (for detailed information about individual-level variables, please refer 
to Table 1). In order to control for compositional differences between countries, we furthermore 
include individual-level generalised trust in the model and grand-mean center all continuous 
variables. This procedure allows for estimating the true contextual effect of the country-level 
indicators.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of model variables  
Variable Observations Mean/Pr
oportion 
SD Range 
Country-level characteristics     
Individualism/Collectivism 28 58.21 18.11 25-89 
Familialism 28 1.32 0.13 1-2 
Generalised trust 28 5.17 0.86 4.01-7.17 
Social protection expenditure  28 24.57 5.81 15.1-34.3 
GDP  28 24267 11254 8700-68100 
     
Individual-level characteristicsa     
Individual generalised trust 36 295 5.15 2.46 1-10 
Age 36 509 50.64 18.02 18-95 
Male 36 509 0.57  0/1 
Urban 36 444 0.52  0/1 
Satisfaction with social life 36 021 7.20 2.18 1-10 
Satisfaction with family life 36 061 7.96 2.11 1-10 
Contact with relatives 35 637 9.62 8.15 0-25 
Contact with non-kin 36 424 13.79 10.34 0-25 
Living alone 36 509 0.23  0/1 
Living with non-kin 36 200 0.01  0/1 
Number of children 36 328 1.58 1.31 0-10 
Married 36 308 0.60  0/1 
Education 36 360 3.11 1.33 0-6 
Note: a Descriptive statistics at the individual level are combined for all 4 datasets used for the analysis. 
 
Method 
The categorical nature of our dependent variables combined with the hierarchical structure of the 
data, where individuals (level-1) are nested in countries (level-2), require a multilevel multinomial 
model. The first level of the model is comprised of three parts: a sampling model, a link function, 
and a structural model. The sampling model follows a multinomial probability distribution. The 
link function is logit and is reflected in ƞ mij =  log (
ϕmij
ϕMij
), where ϕMij = 1 − ∑ ϕmijM−1m=1 . In 
other words, ƞ mij is the log-odds of falling in the category m – kin or professionals – relative to 
the reference category M – non-kin. The structural model at level 1 can be written as ƞ mij =
β0j(m) + ∑ βqj(m)Xqij , where β are fixed effects that vary across categories and Xij is a q-
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dimensional vector of independent variables at the individual level (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
In this model, unlike the multilevel linear regression model, the level-1 residuals Ɛij cannot be 
separately estimated but are fixed to the variance of a standard logistic distribution which equals 
π2/3 (Hedeker, 2007). The level-2 structural model has a parallel form to the level-1 structural 
model with the important addition of u0j(m) – level-2 intercept random effects, one for each 
category. The model can be formally written as β0j(m) = γ00(m) + ∑ γs(m)Wj + u0j(m). Since 
our dependent variables have 3 unordered categories, we have two sets of structural model 
equations.  
We estimate two models for each of the dependent variables. We begin with the empty models, 
which allow for the calculation of the intra-class correlation or the percentage of the variance in 
the probability of selecting any of the categories relative to non-kin that is due to country-level 
characteristics. Subsequently, we simultaneously include all country-level explanatory variables 
and the individual-level control variables5.  
Results 
Descriptive results 
In Europe as a whole, and for all types of support, the observed probability to select non-kin is 
lower than that of kin but higher than the probability of selecting professionals. This pattern largely 
persists at the country level as well, with some noticeable differences. The most important 
difference is for help with looking for a job, where, as can be seen in Figure 5, the citizens of some 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, and Sweden and Iceland have a higher probability 
to turn to non-kin (between 44 and 47%) than to kin or professionals. Similarly, in some CEE 
countries we find a relatively high probability to regard non-kin as a primary source of financial 
help (between 24 and 34%). In contrast, highest probabilities for advice from non-relatives are 
observed in various Western and Nordic countries, and Italy (around 30%). Finally, as shown in 
Figure 6, for help with household chores when one is ill, we find that people in all European 
countries are by far most likely to consider kin as a primary source of support (70% or more). 
When we compare the likelihood of a person turning to non-kin or professionals, however, we find 
that in all European countries but Denmark non-kin help is preferred.  
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Figure 5: Per country observed probabilities for help with looking for a job 
 
 
Figure 6: Per country observed probabilities for help with household chores when one is ill 
 
 
Multilevel results 
As can be seen in Table 2, we find that in more collectivistic countries compared with more 
individualistic countries people are more likely to select non-kin over kin and professionals when 
in need for money, an impact that remains statistically significant after controlling for social 
protection expenditure, generalised trust, norms of family obligations, and GDP. The impact of 
living in a more collectivistic country on people’s choice to turn to non-relatives rather than 
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professionals holds also true for advice, though the substantive importance of collectivism is rather 
small. For the alternative hypothesis – that in more individualistic countries people will select non-
kin over kin more frequently, given they may more easily expand their relationships beyond the 
family – we find no support for any type of assistance. The impact of familialism, on the other 
hand, is both substantively and statistically significant for all types of support but advice. As 
expected, compared with less familialistic countries, people in more familialistic countries seem 
to be less likely to select non-kin over kin. As to generalised trust, we find an opposite than the 
expected association: people in less trustful rather than in more trustful societies are more likely 
to turn to non-kin than to kin for help with household chores and financial help. Our results also 
yield a substantively strong impact of country-level generalised trust on people’s choice for 
professionals rather than non-kin as a source of advice and financial help, an association that we 
did not expect following theoretical insights on generalised trust.   
 
Our hypotheses regarding the impact of institutional context are not confirmed. Unlike what we 
expected, the probability that people will select non-kin over professionals seems not to depend 
on the generosity of social spending in a country, all else being equal. Yet, it is important to note 
that if we do not account for cultural context, social protection expenditure has a higher in 
magnitude and statistically significant impact in the expected direction for all types of support. We 
also expected that in more generous welfare states people will select kin over non-kin more 
frequently, but we find the opposite to be true for help with household chores and advice.  
 
Finally, turning to the coefficient of GDP, we find that in countries with higher GDP people are 
more likely to turn to non-kin than to kin for all types of support but financial help. Living in a 
country with higher rather than lower GDP, however, seems not to be associated with people’s 
choice between non-kin and professionals (with the exception of household help, where people in 
high GDP countries seem to be less likely to select non-kin over professionals). Including GDP in 
the final models does not change considerably the statistical and substantive importance of the 
remaining coefficients.  
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Table 2: Predicted odds ratios for selecting respectively kin and professionals over non-kin 
as a source of help, macro-level estimates (multilevel multinomial analysis)  
 
 
 
Help with 
household 
chores when 
ill 
Advice 
 
Financial 
help 
 
Help with 
looking for 
a job 
Category 1: Kin     
(reference category: non-kin)     
Fixed Effects 
Odds Ratio  
(CI) 
Odds Ratio 
(CI) 
Odds Ratio 
(CI) 
Odds Ratio 
(CI) 
Intercept 
16.618*** 
(13.339,20.704) 
4.012*** 
(3.380,4.762) 
4.650*** 
(3.735,5.790) 
0.875 
(0.720,1.064) 
Individualism/Collectivism 
(H2,4) 
1.003 
(0.994, 1.013) 
1.006 
(0.998,1.015) 
1.017** 
(1.066,1.028) 
1.006 
(0.997,1.016) 
Familialism (H5) 
0.275† 
(0.066, 1.140) 
0.389 
(0.111,1.365) 
0.066** 
(0.013,0.346) 
0.119** 
(0.028,0.517) 
Generalised trust (H1) 
1.444** 
(1.114, 1.870) 
1.058 
(0.842,1.329) 
1.478* 
(1.093,1.999) 
0.929 
(0.709,1.214) 
Social protection        
         expenditure (H7) 
0.943*** 
(0.913, 0.974) 
0.953** 
(0.926,0.980) 
0.994 
(0.968,1.032) 
1.012 
(0.978,1.046) 
GDP (logged) 
0.513** 
(0.313,0.839) 
0.679† 
(0.438,1.052) 
1.074 
(0.598,1.926) 
0.615† 
(0.364,1.040) 
     
Random Effects     
Intercept 
0.103*** 
(0.321) 
0.084*** 
(0.290) 
0.146*** 
(0.382) 
0.116*** 
(0.340) 
     
ICC (in %) 7.6 4.9 8.8 7.1 
Pseudo R2 (in %) 61.7 48.1 53.8 54.1 
Category: Professionals     
(reference category: non-kin)     
Fixed Effects 
Odds Ratio  
(CI) 
Odds Ratio 
(CI) 
Odds Ratio 
(CI) 
Odds Ratio 
(CI) 
Intercept 
0.286*** 
(0.186,0.441) 
0.157*** 
(0.111,0.229) 
0.637* 
(0.444,0.912) 
0.675* 
(0.515,0.884) 
Individualism/Collectivism 
(H3) 
0.993  
(0.977, 1.010) 
1.014† 
(0.99,1.030) 
1.032** 
(1.012,1.052) 
1.013 
(0.997,1.029) 
Familialism  
5.966 
(0.463,76.946) 
0.503 
(0.050,5.097) 
0.203 
(0.011,3.831) 
0.587 
(0.055,6.295) 
Generalised trust 
1.276 
(0.809,2.014) 
1.713* 
(1.133,2.589) 
2.068* 
(1.213,3.523) 
1.268 
(0.823,1.952) 
Social protection    
         expenditure (H6) 
1.046 
(0.988,1.107) 
1.009 
(0.957,1.063) 
1.009 
(0.944,1.079) 
1.018 
(0.964,1.074) 
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GDP (logged) 
2.325* 
(1.003,5.387) 
0.840 
(0.380,1.858) 
1.992 
(0.718,5.525) 
1.484 
(0.649,3.397) 
     
Random Effects     
Intercept 
0.296*** 
(0.544) 
0.256*** 
(0.506) 
0.468*** 
(0.684) 
0.314*** 
(0.560) 
     
ICC (in %) 16.1 13.6 29.0 12.9 
Pseudo R2 (in %) 53.1 50.7 65.2 35.6 
     
Log-likelihood -61423 -61928 -57658 -45343 
Number of observations 32 094 32 549 29 972 23 617 
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, † p ≤ 0.1; numbers in parenthesis for the random effects represent standard 
deviation; CI = confidence interval; Estimation method: Full penalised quasi-likelihood approximation; The formula 
used to calculate the intra-class correlation (ICC) for each category can be written as Var(u0j(m))/(Var(u0j(m)) +
π2
3
) (Hedeker, 2007). 
 
Conclusions and discussion 
This study makes three important contributions to research on support. First, it enhances our 
knowledge on non-kin ties as a source of assistance in Europe; a source that is often overlooked in 
empirical research despite theoretical insights highlighting its relative importance in one’s support 
system (Cantor, 1979; Litwak & Szelenyi, 1969). Second, the study casts new light on the role of 
context in shaping Europeans’ choices for a source of support. Third, unlike previous research 
which focused either on culture or welfare provision and thereby saw them as dichotomous 
alternatives (Viazzo, 2010), we examine cultural and institutional contexts simultaneously and 
contribute to a better understanding of their relative importance.  
 
Our results reveal that both cultural and institutional circumstances matter when selecting a source 
of support, but cultural context appears to be more strongly associated with whether a person will 
turn to non-kin rather than to kin or professionals than institutional context is. Ceteris paribus, we 
find a small, statistically significant impact of social protection expenditure only on the likelihood 
that a person will turn to non-kin rather than to kin for help with household chores and advice. 
This finding is in contrast not only with our expectation regarding the extent to which social 
protection expenditure might have an impact on Europeans’ choices for a source of support, but 
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also regarding the direction of that impact. Following notions of crowding in, we hypothesised that 
increasing generous welfare provision might encourage the receipt of practical and financial help 
from family, but our results appear to be more consistent with Oorschot & Arts (2005) who, by 
focusing on social capital in Europe, demonstrated that more generous social spending goes hand 
in hand with more contacts and stronger feelings towards friends. The scholars embraced an 
explanation revolving around the idea that well-developed states set an example of taking 
responsibility for the good of others and create cultural and structural conditions for the 
development of civil society. Building upon this idea, we put forward that generous welfare 
spending in Europe creates a sense of solidarity, which bolsters people to shift demands for support 
from kin to non-kin.  
 
An important strength of the study lies in carefully conceptualising and analysing cultural context. 
We differentiated between individualistic values and norms of family obligations and suggested 
that their effect on one’s choice for a source of support may differ. Our findings substantiate this 
proposition by demonstrating that individualism/collectivism (valuses) and familialism (norms) 
have a different in magnitude and opposite in direction impact: Higher levels of familialism seem 
to be relatively strongly associated with a lower likelihood that people will turn to non-kin rather 
than to kin for all types of support but advice, whereas higher levels of collectivism seem to have 
a small and positive impact on one’s choice for selecting non-kin over kin or professionals when 
it comes to financial help and advice. These results point towards (1) the importance of normative 
expectations in predicting behavioural intentions, and (2) the need to decompose the broader 
notion of cultural context into more specific and theoretically sound constructs when studying the 
impact of culture on support provision.  
 
On a different but related note, we do not find support for our hypothesis that in countries with 
higher levels of individualism people will select non-kin over kin more frequently, given that in 
more individualistic countries people will be more at ease in expanding their social relationships 
outside the family. A possible explanation for this result is Triandis’ (1993) observation that in 
more individualistic countries people have larger and more diverse networks, but their ties are also 
often casual and entail little emotional involvement. Since support provision is determined not 
only by the number but also by the quality of social relationships (Silverstein, Parrott, & Bengtson, 
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1995), it is plausable to assume that individualistic values of independence and autonomy may be 
a better predictor of differences in social networks size and composition than in sources of support. 
The exact mechanism through which contry-level individualism operates, and the theoretical and 
statistical relationships between the micro and the macro level remain to be scrutinised, however.  
 
As to the last aspect of culture – generalised trust, much to our surprise, we find that in countries 
with lower rather than with higher levels of trust people are more likely to turn to non-kin than to 
kin or professionals. This is in stark contrast with prior research suggesting that generalised trust 
enables the existence of cross-cutting ties and social networks that bind society together and 
thereby serves as the basis for the development of civil society (Newton, 2001). We offer two 
possible reasons for the discrepancy between research findings. First, whilst we employ macro-
level generalised trust to predict individual-level outcomes, much of the prior research used 
individual-level trust to conclude about macro-level outcomes, such as social cohesion and 
economic development. In fact, if we consider the individual-level measure in our models, we can 
conclude that our findings are much in line with prior research, for micro-level trust is significantly 
associated with a greater likelihood that a person will turn to non-kin rather than to kin or 
professionals. Second, we argue that the negative association between macro-level generalised 
trust and the likelihood to select non-kin (over kin or professionals) might be driven by the 
inclusion of a vast number of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in our analysis (12 
out of 28). The CEE countries are characterised by a distinct post-communist context, where 
numerous weak ties, or wide informal networks, are shown to exist despite prevailing low levels 
of generalised trust (Mihaylova, 2004). Völker & Flap (2001) argue that these social networks are 
in fact provision networks which had come to exist during the communist era as a response to the 
shortages created by command economy. In due time from the fall of the Berlin Wall, many of the 
previously scarce goods and services have become available, yet western commodities have been 
costly to the (impoverished) average CEE citizen whilst post-communist services have been 
suffering from a low quality. And whilst levels of generalised trust have further dwindled due to 
the transformation of society and the state, need seems to still force people rely on their previously 
established provision networks. It is outside the scope of this study to go into an in-depth 
discussion of the context of post-communism; what we mean to stress is the need to test theories 
that stem from the wealthy societies of North America and Western Europe on the transforming 
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Central and Eastern European nations. Generalised trust, and for that matter context, is a complex 
phenomenon and it merits a better understanding in comparative sociological research.  
 
Notes 
1 It is important to note, however, that in collectivistic societies people might view relationships with non-kin as 
family-like or as fictive kin ties (Gaines et al., 1997; Hofstede et al., 2010). Such examples are the institutions of 
godparents or when addressing neighbours and friends with aunt, uncle, grandmother or grandfather (Heady & 
Schweitzer, 2010).  
 
2 In order to avoid confusion, we feel the necessity to note that with hypothesis 2 we do not imply that in more 
individualistic countries people will generally select more frequently kin over non-kin. In fact, the mechanism we 
describe does not allow us to suggest that the reverse of our hypothesis is true. In individualistic societies where a 
sense of a strong community and expectations of reciprocal help are less likely to be present, people may still refrain 
from turning to kin and instead opt for professional help.  
 
3 The data were collected originally in 1970 and updated and validated throughout the years. Although data could be 
deemed old, following Minkov & Hofstede (2011) we argue that cultures do evolve but they move together in more 
or less the same cultural direction. Hence, the cultural gaps between countries remain the same. A confirmation of this 
proposition is provided by Inglehart (2008).  
 
4 We opted for EQLS data on generalised trust instead of European Social Survey and European Value Survey data 
for the former includes only 23 of our countries of analysis whilst the latter’s question on generalised trust could only 
be answered with yes and no, which reduces the variability across countries.  
 
5  We also performed the analysis by including separately each macro-level predictor, and by adding all macro-level 
variables together but GDP. The main difference between these models and the models presented in Table 2 will be 
briefly discussed in the results section. Exact estimates are available upon request.  
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Appendices 
Table 3: Predicted odds ratios for selecting respectively kin and professionals over non-kin 
as a source of support, individual-level estimates (multilevel multinomial analysis)  
 
 Help with 
household 
chores when ill 
Advice 
 
Financial help 
 
Help with 
looking for a 
job 
Category 1: Kin  
(reference category: non-kin) 
 
Fixed Effects 
Odds ratio 
(CI) 
Odds ratio 
(CI) 
Odds ratio 
(CI) 
Odds ratio 
(CI) 
Male 0.880*** 
(0.815,0.948) 
0.916** 
(0.865,0.969) 
1.471*** 
(1.371,1.579) 
1.325*** 
(1.243,1.413) 
Age  0.998† 
 (0.995,1.000) 
1.015*** 
(1.013,1.017) 
1.007*** 
(1.004,1.009) 
1.014*** 
(1.012,1.016) 
Urban  0.921* 
(0.853,0.993) 
0.892*** 
(0.842,0.945) 
0.810*** 
(0.753,0.871) 
0.861*** 
(0.806,0.920) 
Living alone  0.346*** 
(0.307,0.390) 
0.825*** 
(0.753,0.903) 
0.685*** 
(0.609,0.771) 
0.719*** 
(0.643,0.804) 
Living with non-kin  0.262*** 
(0.207,0.333) 
0.827† 
(0.662,1.035) 
0.771† 
(0.586,1.015) 
0.870 
(0.675,1.121) 
Contact with relatives  1.039*** 
(1.033,1.044) 
1.024*** 
(1.021,1.028) 
1.025*** 
(1.020,1.029) 
1.017*** 
(1.013,1.021) 
Contact with non-kin  0.980*** 
(0.977,0.984) 
0.991*** 
(0.989,0.994) 
0.994*** 
(0.991,0.998) 
0.995** 
(0.992,0.999) 
Individual trust 0.980* 
(0.964,0.996) 
0.976*** 
(0.964,0.988) 
0.993 
(0.978,1.008) 
0.988† 
(0.974,1.001) 
Satisfaction with  
                family life 
1.191*** 
(1.167,1.215) 
1.154*** 
(1.136,1.173) 
1.132*** 
(1.110,1.154) 
1.060*** 
(1.040,1.080) 
Satisfaction with  
                social life 
0.966*** 
(0.946,0.986) 
0.971*** 
(0.956,0.987) 
0.975* 
(0.956,0.994) 
1.001 
(0.983,1.019) 
Number of children 1.146*** 
(1.107,1.185) 
1.060*** 
(1.033,1.088) 
1.003 
(0.970,1.037) 
0.985 
(0.955,1.016) 
Married  1.023 
(0.913,1.149) 
1.415*** 
(1.307,1.531) 
0.873* 
(0.787,0.968) 
0.921† 
(0.842,1.007) 
Education  0.906*** 
(0.879,0.933) 
0.891*** 
(0.871,0.912) 
0.986 
(0.958,1.016) 
0.814*** 
(0.792,0.836) 
Category 2: Professionals 
(reference category: non-kin) 
 
Fixed Effects 
Odds ratio 
(CI) 
Odds ratio 
(CI) 
Odds ratio 
(CI) 
Odds ratio 
(CI) 
Male  0.834* 
(0.721,0.965) 
0.853* 
(0.753,0.967) 
1.125* 
(1.017,1.246) 
1.247 
(1.163,1.338) 
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Age  1.034*** 
(1.029,1.039) 
1.020*** 
(1.016,1.024) 
1.024*** 
(1.020,1.027) 
1.008*** 
(1.005,1.010) 
Urban  0.945 
(0.815.1.094) 
0.867* 
(0.763,0.986) 
0.786*** 
(0.708,0.872) 
0.971*** 
(0.903,1.044) 
Living alone  0.639*** 
(0.491,0.824) 
0.891† 
(0.719,1.104) 
0.733*** 
(0.614,0.875) 
0.772*** 
(0.685,0.870) 
Living with non-kin  0.333** 
(0.151,0.734) 
0.520 
(0.251,1.077) 
0.826 
(0.530,1.289) 
0.688* 
(0.516,0.918) 
Contact with relatives  0.993 
(0.982,1.004) 
0.990* 
(0.981,0.999) 
0.997 
(0.990,1.004) 
0.994** 
(0.989,0.998) 
Contact with non-kin  0.969*** 
(0.962,0.976) 
0.986*** 
(0.980,0.992) 
0.992** 
(0.987,0.997) 
0.997† 
(0.993,1.000) 
Individual trust  0.971† 
(0.942, 1.002) 
 0.975 † 
(0.949,1.002) 
0.957*** 
(0.936,0.978) 
0.984* 
(0.968,0.999) 
Satisfaction with  
                 family life 
1.051* 
(1.011,1.093) 
0.985 
(0.952,1.019) 
1.077*** 
(1.046,1.109) 
1.043*** 
(1.021,1.064) 
Satisfaction with  
                social life  
0.902*** 
(0.866,0.940) 
0.896*** 
(0.866,0.928) 
0.926*** 
(0.900,0.952) 
0.933*** 
(0.915,0.952) 
Number of children  0.980 
(0.923,1.042) 
1.090*** 
(1.036,1.146) 
1.010 
(0.966,1.055) 
1.049** 
(1.015,1.084) 
Married  0.890  
(0.691, 1.146) 
1.261* 
(1.041,1.527) 
0.882 
(0.754,1.032) 
0.815*** 
(0.739,0.900) 
Education 0.872*** 
(0.824,0.922) 
0.931** 
(0.887,0.977) 
0.954* 
(0.915,0.994) 
0.958** 
(0.931,0.986) 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, † p ≤ 0.1; CI = confidence interval 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations between country-level characteristics 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Individualism/Collectivism 1 0.374 0.418 0.472 0.558 
2 Generalised trust  1 0.660 0.550 0.650 
3 Social protection expenditure as a percentage of  
GDP  
  1 0.348 0.617 
4 Familialism    1 0.350 
5  GDP (logged)     1 
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